000			01641naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0042711123037
003			OSt
005			20190211171250.0
008			100427s2000 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKAM, Chrisopher _939726
245	1	0	_aNot just parliamentary "cowboys and indians" : _bministerial responsability and bureaucratic drift
260			_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cJuly 2000
520	3		_aA strict interpretation of the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility requires that the minister alone bear public responsibility for her department's actions. Critics charge that it is not sensible to hold a mminister solel responsible for departmental errors when government departments are so large and complex, and senior bureaucrats so powerful in their own right; senior bureaucrats should be made directly accountable to Parliament. The paper uses a game theoretic model to show that this criticism is misguided. To the extent that politicians more effectively police the bureaucracy when they are governed by a doctrine of ministerial responsibility than when they are not, the doctrine strengthens accountability. Much of the doctrine's force comes from the threat of ministerial resignation, but the opportunities that the doctrine creates for opposition parties to embarrass the government also contribute to its efficacy.
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions _g13, 3, p. 365-392 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, July 2000 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100427 _b1112^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100428 _b1643^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32641 _d32641
041			_aeng