000			01798naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0042712272337
003			OSt
005			20190211171300.0
008			100427s2001 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKOWERT, Paul A. _939732
245	1	0	_aLeadership and learning in political groups : _bthe management of advice in the iran-contra affair
260			_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cApril 2001
520	3		_aFor over two decades, the theory of groupthink proposed by Irving Janis has remained the most prominent analysis of group dynamics in policy-making. Suffering from its own popularity, groupthink has become a catch-all phrase without a clear meaning. Moreover, theories of group decision-making—even when applied to public policy-making—have typically ignored political variables, focusing almost exclusively on psychological arguments. This article offers three more narrowly construed propositions about policy-making groups: (1) that extremes in the distribution of power within a decision group reduces the integrative complexity of that group's deliberations and, thus, a leader's ability to learn; (2) that extremes in group size produce similar effects; and (3) that the integrative complexity of deliberations is improved when power concentration is appropriate to group size. An examination of the Reagan Administration's decision-making in two phases of the Iran-Contra affair lends support to these hypotheses and reveals the importance of political structure in decision group dynamics.
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions _g14, 2, p. 201-232 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, April 2001 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100427 _b1227^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100428 _b1637^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32654 _d32654
041			_aeng