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005 | 20190211171306.0 | ||
008 | 100428s2001 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
100 | 1 |
_aKAWABATA, Eiji _939742 |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aSanction power, jurisdiction, and economic policy-making : _bexplaining contemporary telecommunications policy in Japan |
260 |
_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cOctober 2001 |
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520 | 3 | _aVariation in policy-making is an important analytical issue in public policy analysis, but it has not been extensively discussed in the literature on Japanese politics and political economy. Focusing on the interaction between state and societal actors, this article presents a causal argument to account for variation in Japanese economic policy-making. It is argued that variation in policy-making patterns is determined by the strength of a bureaucracy's sanction power and the exclusivity of its jurisdiction. This argument is elaborated through analysis of four related cases of Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) policy-making: the privatization process of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT), the regulation of telecommunications after NTT privatization, the promotion of advanced telecommunications, and the reorganization of NTT. The causal framework is also applied to contemporary Ministry of International Trade and Industry economic policy-making to highlight the argument's preliminary applicability to Japanese policy-making. This analysis of Japanese policy-making lays a base for further analysis of variation in policy-making in general. | |
773 | 0 | 8 |
_tGovernance: An International Joural of Policy, Administration, and Institutions _g14, 4, p. 399-427 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, October 2001 _xISSN 09521895 _w |
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_a20100428 _b1219^b _cDaiane |
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_a20100429 _b1607^b _cCarolina |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32670 _d32670 |
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041 | _aeng |