000			01744naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0043010502837
003			OSt
005			20190211171331.0
008			100430s1998 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aYISHAI, Yael _939774
245	1	0	_aThe guardian state : _ba comparative analysis of interest group regulation
260			_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cApril 1998
520	3		_aThis article discusses the regulation of interest groups by the state in four democracies: two liberal, namely Australia and Canada, and two nonliberal, namely Israel and Turkey. The analysis centers on five questions: the scope of regulation, its causes, public reaction to regulation, implementation of regulation, and its impact on state and society. The article suggests that the type of regime does make a difference regarding all parameters of regulation. Liberal democracies tend to regulate strategy of interest groups; regulation is caused by fear of undue associational pressure exerted on decision-makers. The public tends to be hostile to regulation; implementation is strict, but impact on both interest groups and society is modest. Nonliberal democracies tend to regulate interest groups' structure. Regulation is caused by fear of subversion and threats to the state's survival. The public is compliant disregarding regulation. Implementation is lax and impact may be potentially substantial. These hypotheses were largely confirmed in the four cases under consideration.
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration _g11, 2, p. 153-176 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, April 1998 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100430 _b1050^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100506 _b0841^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32721 _d32721
041			_aeng