000			01858naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0050311101537
003			OSt
005			20190211171400.0
008			100503s1996 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aPOLLACK, Mark A. _939790
245	1	0	_aThe new institutionalism and EC governance : _bThe promise and limits of institutional analysis
260			_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cOctober 1996
520	3		_aThe "new" institutionalisms" in rational choice and historical analysis are being applied with increasing sophistication and accuracy to the study of European Community governance. The basic premise of such institutional approaches is that EC institutions, once created, "take on a life of their own," acting as independent or intervening variables between the preferences and power of the member governments on the one hand, and the ultimate policy outputs of EC governance on the other. The challenge for institutionalist theory consists in constructing a precise analytical tool-box that will allow us to make specific predictions about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, EC institutions may exert such an independent causal influence. EC institutions matter, I suggest, insofar as they: lend stability to an existing institutional structure; shape any subsequent amendment of those institutions; allow individual member governments to be outvoted by qualified majority; cause member states to lose control of events through lock-ins; and subject member governments to the actions of supranational agents whose behavior they can control only imperfectly.
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration _g9, 4, p. 429-458 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, October 1996 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100503 _b1110^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100505 _b1707^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32759 _d32759
041			_aeng