000 02145naa a2200205uu 4500
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008 100503s1996 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100 1 _aJACKSON, Michael
_931225
245 1 0 _aInside moves and outside views :
_ban australian case study of elite and public perceptions of political corruption
260 _aMalden :
_bWiley-Blackwell,
_cJanuary 1996
520 3 _aThe search for a definition of political corruption that adequately captures the nuances of governmental activity has been a long one. This article defends social or attitudinal definitions of corruption against some recent criticisms. It examines the value of Arnold Heidenheimer's widely cited distinctions among "black,""gray," and "white" corruption using empirical evidence from an interview study of over 100 Australian politicians and 500 voters. The results show that the broad dimensions of corruption — the official, the donor, the payoff, and the favor — identified by John Peters and Susan Welch affect the views of both politicians and voters alike.
520 3 _aNonetheless, elites and the public come to judgments from different perspectives, and they judge some acts differently. Put another way, some corruption is gray. Politicians judge actions more subtly than do voters, who are more likely to see corruption in all acts. As Michael Johnston has suggested, the different experiences of political insiders and outsiders explain this disparity in their moral outlooks. Insiders are socialized to see at least some actions as functional and therefore not corrupt. Outsiders, unaware of the insiders' rules, tend to judge political action by moral absolutes. Thus the structure of liberal democratic government contributes to conflicting elite and public views of political right and wrong.
700 1 _aSMITH, Rodney
_923374
773 0 8 _tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration
_g9, 1, p. 23-42
_dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, January 1996
_xISSN 09521895
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20100503
_b1315^b
_cDaiane
998 _a20100505
_b1703^b
_cCarolina
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c32770
_d32770
041 _aeng