000			02042naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0050410414537
003			OSt
005			20190211171429.0
008			100504s1995 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKHADEMIAN, Anne M. _920381
245	1	0	_aWhen missions matter : _bprofessional priorities and the "stepchild" of supervisory programs
260			_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cJanuary 1995
520	3		_aIf there is a clear bottom line to the literature on political control of the bureaucracy, it is that control is never complete. Principals can be multiple, priorities diverse, preferences for policy incomplete and not articulated, and intentional choice lost in the muddle. Yet as long as bureaucratic studies remain focused upon outside political actors, or at best, the political appointee at the helm of an agency, we will not make many advances in our understanding of important organizational dynamics that act as an independent force upon the phenomenon of bureaucratic behavior. This article suggests a politically cognizant return to the bureaucracy by examining the distinct management efforts of the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC to supervise the consumer and civil rights obligations of banks, known collectively as "compliance" obligations. The same mandates, issued and overseen by the same political principals, and implemented within common professional cultures, have been managed in ways that vary in the context of each agency's organizational mission. It is argued that organizational mission provides an empirical link between the priorities and mandates imposed from a system of "overhead democracy," and the influential priorities of a common professional group (bank examiners) in each of the agencies.
773	0	8	_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy and Adminitration _g8, 1, p. 26-57 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackwell, January 1995 _xISSN 09521895 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100504 _b1041^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100505 _b1655^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c32805 _d32805
041			_aeng