000			01782naa a2200205uu 4500
001			0051411005137
003			OSt
005			20190211171607.0
008			100514s2003 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aCHOUDHURY, Enamul _92195
245	1	0	_aAn analysis of institutional and political factors affecting state capital expenditure
260			_aNew York : _bMarcel Dekker, _c2003
520	3		_aThis article examines state government spending patterns for capital projects during the late 1970s and early 1980s as a function of some of the institutional arrangements and procedural characteristics of state legislatures. The analysis is informed by the literature on distributive policymaking, which argues that lawmakers seek to send targetable benefits, such as capital projects, to their constituencies in pursuit of personal electoral benefits. Using a pooled, cross-sectional time-series approach, the authors find that states with a large number of seats in the lower chambers of their legislatures devoted a somewhat smaller portion of their state budgets to capital projects than did states with smaller lower chambers, ceteris paribus. Contrary to some log-rolling models, the number of appropriations bills employed by a legislature seems to discourage capital spending, as does membership turnover in the upper chamber. This indicates that the capital budgeting process is not nearly as dominated by the executive branch as is commonly believed.
700	1		_aCLINGERMAYER, James C. _937063
700	1		_aDASSE, Carl M. _940096
773	0	8	_tInternational Journal of Public Administration - IJPA _g26, 4, p. 373-398 _dNew York : Marcel Dekker, 2003 _xISSN 01900692 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100514 _b1100^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100517 _b1036^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c33130 _d33130
041			_aeng