000			01309naa a2200193uu 4500
001			0051411172937
003			OSt
005			20190211171614.0
008			100514s2003 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aCLARK, Ephraim _92245
245	1	0	_aWater management in France : _bdelegation and market based
260			_aNew York : _bMarcel Dekker, _c2003
520	3		_aIn this paper, we show that the principle of equal access in the French legal code and the explicit flexibility of the actual delegation contract concerning prices and responsibility for risk have created the conditions for an effective system of market based, auto-regulation that maximizes community welfare while maintaining a fair return for the delegated firm. The system is market based because auto-regulation occurs within price-profit interval over which delegation is acceptable to both parties. For the system to be effective, the threat to revoke must be credible and the conflict of interest between the mayor and the commune must be resolved.
700	1		_aMONDELLO, Gérard _940104
773	0	8	_tInternational Journal of Public Administration - IJPA _g26, 3, p. 317-328 _dNew York : Marcel Dekker, 2003 _xISSN 01900692 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100514 _b1117^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100517 _b1034^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c33138 _d33138
041			_aeng