000			01227naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0051717435137
003			OSt
005			20190211171622.0
008			100517s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aARARAL, Eduardo _940138
245	1	0	_aThe strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play : _ban institutional rational choice analysis
260			_aCary : _bOxford University, _coct. 2009
520	3		_aForeign aid plays an important role in developing countries, but little is empirically known how it affects incentives of recipient bureaucracies. I provide a model and analytic case study to understand the strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play. My findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical expectations of institutional rational choice: bureaucrats attempt to ensure bureaucratic survival, whereas donors ensure growth of loan portfolio. These findings, however, are not consistent with the Samaritan's Dilemma and the Patron's Dilemma
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory _g19, 4, p. 852-872 _dCary : Oxford University, oct. 2009 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100517 _b1743^b _cDaiane
998			_a20120517 _b1348^b _cGeisneer
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c33174 _d33174
041			_aeng