000			01652naa a2200217uu 4500
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003			OSt
005			20190211171844.0
008			100520s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSINGER, Marcos _940355
245	1	0	_aIf prevention is better than cure, why do firms do the opposite?
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _cset./out. 2009
520	3		_aCommon wisdom tells that, regarding quality, prevention is better than appraisal. Although scholars and practitioners concur with that, firms in practice prioritise appraisal, leading to high non-conformance quality costs. To unravel this puzzle, we understand quality as the combined result of prevention, done by the firm's back office (e.g. production), and appraisal, done by the front office (e.g. marketing). We propose a game theoretic model for which quality expenditure is an equilibrium outcome that depends on the cost of technology, the customers' sensitivity to quality, and the distribution of (variable) incentives within the firm. We conjecture those conditions for the reported quality expenditures of several companies, and calculate their optimal quality investment policy. As advocated by experts, we find that prevention should more than double appraisal, and non-conformance costs should approach zero.
590			_aVolume 20
590			_aNumbers 9-10
700	1		_aDONOSO, Patricio _940356
773	0	8	_tTotal Quality Management & Business Excellence _g20, 9-10, p. 905-919 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, set./out. 2009 _xISSN 14783363 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100520 _b1500^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100531 _b1323^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c33409 _d33409
041			_aeng