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008			100527s1999 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aDERLUGUIAN, Georig M. _940610
245	1	0	_aEthnofederalism and ethnonationalism in the separatist politics of chechnya and tatarstan : _bsources or resources?
260			_aNew York : _bMarcel Dekker, _c1999
520	3		_aCommon explanations of the recent war in Chechnya add up to an astonishingly overdetermined picture. The conflict between Russia's central government and its separatist ethnic autonomy was blamed on several grand factors: oil interests, resurgent Islam, imperial collapse, international terrorism, organized crime. Superficially, Chechnya shares most of these features with Tatarstan — another defiant republic of the Russian Federation which has oil, notorious gangsters, and a native population of Islamic heritage. A more detailed account shows, however, that the two state entities have little in common except the Soviet-made institutional framework. Tatarstan is a rare example of an ethnically non-Russian republic within the very urban industrial core of the former USSR, while Chechnya was patently peripheral. Differences in historical legacies and present-day social compositions conditioned very different outcomes of multifaceted political struggles that accompanied the demise of Soviet empire. In Tatarstan, local ethnically-colored nomenklatura exploited the chaotic transition to claim property rights over the local economy. The new rhetoric of national revival which the nationally-minded wing of Tatar intelligentsia advanced during Gorbachev's relaxation of censorship, was used by the Tatar nomenklatura to justify its struggle for economic property rights and exclusive political jurisdiction in its territory. By contrast, the Communist patronage network which ruled Chechnya until 1991 was too dependent on the central government for subsidies and coercive resources to follow the Tatarstan example. In the aftermath of August 1991 hardliner coup, when the Chechen apparatchiks misplaced their bets in Moscow's politics and momentarily lost support of the central government, they were swept away by the social movement of rural masses and urban marginal intellectuals. In its turn revolution, the only such outcome among the republics of the Russian Federation (but not the USSR), created an inherently unstable regime in Chechnya which could legitimate itself only with the idea of national independence and, once Moscow attempted to destabilize it, through the patriotic war.
590			_aVolume 22
590			_aNumbers 9-10
773	0	8	_tInternational Journal of Public Administration - IJPA _g22, 9-10, p. 1387-1428 _dNew York : Marcel Dekker, 1999 _xISSN 01900692 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100527 _b1442^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100531 _b1714^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c33615 _d33615
041			_aeng