000			01939naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0052716135437
003			OSt
005			20190211172119.0
008			100527s1999 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMBAKU, John Mukum _940644
245	1	0	_aCorruption cleanups in developing societies : _bthe public choice perspective
260			_aNew York : _bMarcel Dekker, _c1999
520	3		_aThis paper employs the method of public choice to examine corruption cleanup strategies in the developing countries, with special emphasis on Africa. Most African countries have weak, inefficient and non-viable institutional arrangements and heavily regulated economies. Pervasive state intrusion in all aspects of economic activities has created many opportunities for rent seeking. Bureaucrats who are charged with implementing national development programs and enforcing the state's regulations, are able to extort bribes from entrepreneurs seeking favors from the government. Favors sought include opportunities to obtain lucrative import licenses, foreign exchange permits, access to subsidized credit, and investment and production licenses, and to minimize taxes that an enterprise must pay the state. Bureaucratic corruption, thus, is primarily rent-seeking behavior and is directly related to the scope and level of government intervention in private exchange. The politicization of resource allocation accounts for a significant part of bureaucratic corruption in the developing countries. Thus, any attempt to eliminate corruption from these societies must begin with effective institutional reforms which constitutionally limit the ability of the state to intervene in private exchange.
773	0	8	_tInternational Journal of Public Administration - IJPA _g22, 2, p. 309-345 _dNew York : Marcel Dekker, 1999 _xISSN 01900692 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100527 _b1613^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100531 _b1634^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c33650 _d33650
041			_aeng