000			02160naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0060715441637
003			OSt
005			20190211172534.0
008			100607s1995 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWEBER, Axel A. _940957
245	1	0	_aMonetary policy in Europe : _btowards a european central bank and one european currency
260			_aNew York : _bMarcel Dekker, _c1995
520	3		_aMost alternative blueprints for European Monetary Union (EMU) differ in their opinions about convergence requirements or the need for binding fiscal rules and controls of individual national governments' debt policies, but there is, if not complete consensus, widespread agreement that the European Central Bank (ECB) should be independent of political control from both European Community (EC) institutions and national governments. The main argument for an independent European central bank is empirical: those countries in which central banks are insulated from the political process and charged with maintaining price stability have experienced the lowest and most stable inflation rates in recent decades. The present paper reviews and critically evaluates this political economy literature which relates inflation performances to the constitutional features of central bank statutes. Based on this assessment the draft statutes of the ECB and the constitutions of the individual European national central banks are discussed in terms of the independence they grant central bank board members from partisan influences. Furthermore, concrete country-specific suggestions for enhancing central bank independence during stage two of the gradual transition to EMU, which is to be completed by 1999, are made. It is argued that in some countries laborious constitutional reforms of central bank statutes are overdue and must be implemented in order to make these institutions fit for an anti-inflationary EMU.
773	0	8	_tInternational Journal of Public Administration - IJPA _g18, 10, p. 1513-1562 _dNew York : Marcel Dekker, 1995 _xISSN 01900692 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100607 _b1544^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100607 _b1701^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34104 _d34104
041			_aeng