000 | 01552naa a2200193uu 4500 | ||
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001 | 0060811170437 | ||
003 | OSt | ||
005 | 20190211172600.0 | ||
008 | 100608s1995 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
100 | 1 |
_aWOLLER, Gary _940986 |
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245 | 1 | 0 | _aAn ethical defense of regulatory forbearance |
260 |
_aNew York : _bMarcel Dekker, _c1995 |
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520 | 3 | _aForbearance is one of the principal tools of regulatory enforcement. To regulatory critics, forbearance is reflective of venal, lazy, or weak regulators more interested in pursuing private gains than the public interest. To enforcement officials, however, such views reflect unrealistic images of regulated firms and the regulatory environment. Rather, they see forbearance as a rational and ethical response to the complexities of economic and social regulation. The ethical justification for forbearance is rooted in utilitarian moral philosophy, in which forbearance is seen as the most effective way to promote the social purposes of regulation. Nonetheless, individual acts of forbearance may fail to fulfill utilitarian ethical standards. This occurs when forbearance becomes a routinized application of organizational or extra-organizational norms, instead of a case-by-case strategy of regulatory enforcement. | |
700 | 1 |
_aBRADY, F. Neil _927420 |
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773 | 0 | 8 |
_tInternational Journal of Public Administration - IJPA _g18, 5, p. 851-877 _dNew York : Marcel Dekker, 1995 _xISSN 01900692 _w |
942 | _cS | ||
998 |
_a20100608 _b1117^b _cDaiane |
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998 |
_a20100616 _b1038^b _cCarolina |
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999 |
_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34143 _d34143 |
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041 | _aeng |