000			01506naa a2200193uu 4500
001			0061013414737
003			OSt
005			20190211172739.0
008			100610s1988 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aCOTHRAN, Dan A. _941107
245	1	0	_aMexican presidents and budgetary secrecy
260			_aNew York : _bMarcel Dekker, _c1988
520	3		_aA government budget in most industrial countries is a reasonably accurate statement of that government's fiscal intentions for the coming year. In less industrialized countries, however, the budget is often not a very accurate indicator of what the government will do. From the 1930s until the 1980s, the Mexican national government budgeted like a non-industrial country in certain ways. In particular, projected spending and actual spending bore little resemblance to each other. From 1933 until at least 1982, the Mexican government always spent more than it indicated in its formal budget, sometimes as much as 50 to 100 percent more. Moreover, the “excess” was spent in semi-secrecy with full public disclosure usually not occurring until years later. This paper examines the aggregate pattern of this budgetary gap and its strategic use by Mexican presidents
700	1		_aCOTHRAN, Cheryl Cole _941108
773	0	8	_tInternational Journal of Public Administration - IJPA _g11, 3, p. 311-340 _dNew York : Marcel Dekker, 1988 _xISSN 01900692 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100610 _b1341^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100615 _b1207^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34295 _d34295
041			_aeng