000			01741naa a2200193uu 4500
001			0061813165337
003			OSt
005			20190211172845.0
008			100618s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBRANDT, Urs Steiner _938437
245	1	0	_aBureaucrats at sea : _ba budget catch model
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _cApril 2006
520	3		_aWe develop a model of bureaucratic budget catching, where bureaucracies compete for resources just like fishermen. Considering taxpayers' money a free access resource in the absence of tight fiscal control (passive sponsors), bureaucratic self-interest may induce excessive lobbying behavior even from the perspective of the bureaucrats themselves. Our contribution is to extend the original Niskanen (1971) model by suggesting that bureaucrats will expend resources on lobbying rather than provide public goods, thus rendering the bureaus more innefficient. Such decreases in public good provision affect production in society negatively in the next period, leaving fewer resources for the total group of bureaucrats. One possible empirical implication could be bureaucratic lobbying within the EU due to the institutional stronghold of the Commission. Arguably, the weak institutional position of European Parliament probably contributed to the observable priority of public goods provision. However, rigorous empirical investigations are needed in future to verify or reject our theoretical claims.
700	1		_aSVENDSEN, Gert Tinggaard _921160
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g13, 3, p. 329-340 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, April 2006 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100618 _b1316^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100623 _b1739^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34434 _d34434
041			_aeng