000			01589naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0062110193237
003			OSt
005			20190211172902.0
008			100621s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMATTILA, Mikko _917968
245	1	0	_aFiscal transfers and redistribution in the European Union : _bdo smaller member states get more than their share?
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _cJanuary 2006
520	3		_aIn this article redistribution in the EU and fiscal transfers between member states are analysed. Which countries are beneficiaries, which are contributors, and what factors affect countries' net fiscal balances? Fiscal transfers among EU member states are partially explained by differences in the countries' economic prosperity, as well as by institutional features that favour smaller EU members. The budget is redistributive both on the revenue and on the expenditure side. Smaller member states can use their overrepresentation in the Council to obtain more benefits than their level of economic development alone would justify. Yet, this effect is not discernible on the revenue side of the budget. Overrepresented member states are not able to use their 'extra' voting power to reduce their share of EU costs. This finding is probably explained by the relatively simple rules that govern the financing of the budget.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g13, 1, p. 34-51 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, January 2006 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100621 _b1019^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100623 _b1742^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34455 _d34455
041			_aeng