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001 0062111214137
003 OSt
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008 100621s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100 1 _aFISCHHOFF, Baruch
_916645
245 1 0 _aMutually assured support :
_ba security doctrine for terrorism nuclear weapon threats
260 _aThousand Oaks :
_bSAGE,
_cJuly 2008
520 3 _aIf the United States were subject to a terrorist nuclear attack, its president would face overwhelming political pressure to respond decisively. A well-prepared response could help both to prevent additional attacks and to bring the perpetrators to justice. An instinctive response could be cataclysmically ineffective, inflicting enormous collateral damage without achieving either deterrence or justice. An international security doctrine of Mutually Assured Support can make the response to such attacks more effective as well as less likely—by requiring preparations that reduce the threat. The doctrine requires all subscribing nations to mobilize fully in support of the attacked nation, in return for a promise of nonretaliation. It provides a vehicle for domestic and international leadership, allowing the president to engage the American people, from a position of strength, around an issue that has had little public discussion. The authors describe its rationale, implications, and implementation.
700 1 _aATRAN, Scot
_941239
700 1 _aSAGEMAN, Marc
_941240
773 0 8 _tThe Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
_g618, p. 160-167
_dThousand Oaks : SAGE, July 2008
_xISSN 00027162
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20100621
_b1121^b
_cDaiane
998 _a20100624
_b1012^b
_cCarolina
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c34483
_d34483
041 _aeng