000			01626naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0062113252237
003			OSt
005			20190211172947.0
008			100621s2003 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aANDREWS, David M. _941267
245	1	0	_aThe committee of central bank governors as a source of rules
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _cDecember 2003
520	3		_aThe creation of economic and monetary union (EMU) offers an unusual opportunity to examine how informal institutional practices are sometimes retained in the later adoption of formal rules. Long before the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, the central banks of the Community's member states had developed numerous informal practices regarding their mutual relations; there is considerable continuity between those practices and the organizational forms, rules, and norms of behaviour that obtain under EMU. This article employs previously unpublished documentary evidence to describe the emergence of informal practices of co-operation amongst the central banks of the member states of what was then the European Community, focusing on questions of leadership and staffing during the thirty-year history of the Committee of Central Bank Governors. The article also examines the rapid evolution of these practices in the early 1990s in the face of a likely political agreement to form a monetary union.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g10, 6, p. 956-973 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, December 2003 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100621 _b1325^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100623 _b1759^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34511 _d34511
041			_aeng