000			01431naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0062210192837
003			OSt
005			20190211172954.0
008			100622s2003 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aJABKO, Nicolas _941271
245	1	0	_aDemocracy in the age of the euro
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _cOctober 2003
520	3		_aThe Maastricht Treaty established an independent European Central Bank (ECB) in charge of managing Europe's new currency, the euro. But in recent years, many have expressed fears that the ECB's independence could lead to an undemocratic situation in which central bankers are never held accountable. Based on an analysis of the relations between the ECB and the European Parliament, this article demonstrates the emergence of a certain practice of central bank accountability. This practice, which is both real and limited, can be understood as the result of a power play between central bankers and parliamentarians in the institutional context of the European Union. In the age of the euro and economic globalization, the difficulty of defining a border between expertise and politics casts a new light on a fundamental problem of democracy.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g10, 5, p. 710-739 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, October 2003 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100622 _b1019^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100623 _b1757^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34532 _d34532
041			_aeng