000			01739naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0062211035437
003			OSt
005			20190211173003.0
008			100622s2003 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWAGNER, Wolfgang _915001
245	1	0	_aWhy the EU's common foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental : _ba rationalist institutional choice analysis of european crisis management policy
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _cAugust 2003
520	3		_aCritics have suggested communitarizing the European Union's common foreign and security policy in order to increase its effectiveness. Drawing on rationalist theories of regimes and institutional choice, this paper argues that the delegation of competencies to the EU's supranational institutions is unlikely to make European crisis management more effective. Crisis management policy is best understood as a fast co-ordination game in which member states react to international crises under tight time pressure. From this perspective, agreements are self-enforcing and strong institutions are not required. In particular, none of the functions that a delegation of competencies is expected to perform - i.e. formal agenda- setting, monitoring and sanctioning, executing as well as locking-in agreements - plays a pivotal role in crisis management. In contrast, the extension and application of qualified majority voting can speed up decision-making which is the key to a more effective common foreign and security policy.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g10, 4, p. 576-595 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, August 2003 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100622 _b1103^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100623 _b1711^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34543 _d34543
041			_aeng