000			01721naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0062211054337
003			OSt
005			20190211173004.0
008			100622s2003 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aTRAXLER, Franz _941278
245	1	0	_aBargaining institutions and the monetary regime : _ba cross-national comparison and its implications for European monetary union
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _cAugust 2003
520	3		_aThe interaction between bargaining and monetary policy involves three relationships: the interaction of the bargainers with (a) each other; (b) the monetary regime; and (c) their rank and file. Research has centred on (a) and (b) and neglected (c). However, in practice, interaction (c) gains in importance, since bargaining is a multi- level process in the eurozone. Analytically, this interaction should not be neglected, since the monetary regime can target the bargainers more effectively than their rank and file. This paper conceptualizes the interaction between bargaining and monetary policy in a way which includes all three relationships. Based on a comparison of fifteen European countries, it is shown that the responsiveness of alternative bargaining institutions to the monetary regime depends on their capacity for making the rank and file comply, and that these institutions also differ in which monetary parameter they are sensitive to. The implications of these findings for EMU are discussed in the paper's final section.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g10, 4, p. 596-615 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, August 2003 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100622 _b1105^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100623 _b1711^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34544 _d34544
041			_aeng