000			01893naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0062211274237
003			OSt
005			20190211173014.0
008			100622s2003 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKRAPOHL, Sebastian _941289
245	1	0	_aRisk regulation in the EU between interests and expertise : _bthe case of BSE
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _cApril 2003
520	3		_aThis article analyses decision-making within the EU's committee system for BSE regulations during the latest phase of the mad cow scandal between Spring 2000 and Spring 2001. As the empirical analysis shows, the two concepts which dominate the academic discussion - the principal-agent theory and the concept of deliberative supranationalism - each focus on different committees within this complex institutional framework. While the principal-agent theory emphasizes the intergovernmental character of oversight committees, the concept of deliberative supranationalism stresses the supranational character of scientific committees. However, this article demonstrates that there is a differentiation within the decision-making system and a functional division of labour between the different kinds of committees. The oversight committees fulfil the control function in the interests of the member states, whereas the scientific committees advise the Commission during the policy formulation process. Under specific circumstances the scientific committees gain significant influence over the decisions in the oversight committees and, thereby, on the final policy outcome. In this way, the different committees help to increase the EU's problem-solving capacity.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g10, 2, p. 189-207 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, April 2003 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100622 _b1127^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100623 _b1706^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34556 _d34556
041			_aeng