000			01608naa a2200205uu 4500
001			0062212592437
003			OSt
005			20190211173027.0
008			100622s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSAUTTER, John A. _941309
245	1	0	_aA dual-edged sword : _bempathy and collective action in the prisoner's dilemma
260			_aThousand Oaks : _bSAGE, _cNovember 2007
520	3		_aResearchers guided by evolutionary psychology have theorized that in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, reciprocal behavior is a product of evolutionary design, where individuals are guided by an innate sense of fairness for equal outcomes. Empathy as a prosocial emotion could be a key to understanding the psychological underpinnings of why and who tends to cooperate in a collective act. In short, why are some individuals more prone to participate in collective action? The authors test the hypothesis that a prosocial psychological disposition, stemming from self-reported empathy, will lead to group-oriented behavior in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Results suggest that an empathetic disposition does not lead to a higher rate of cooperation but interacts with environmental conditioning to produce either a highly cooperative or highly uncooperative personality type.
700	1		_aLITTVAY, Levente _941310
700	1		_aBEARNES, Brennen _941311
773	0	8	_tThe Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science _g614, p. 154-171 _dThousand Oaks : SAGE, November 2007 _xISSN 00027162 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100622 _b1259^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100624 _b1032^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34571 _d34571
041			_aeng