000			01688naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0062415375737
003			OSt
005			20190211173053.0
008			100624s2000 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aDOLEYS, Thomas J. _941327
245	1	0	_aMember states and the european commission : _btheoretical insights from the new economics of organization
260			_aLondon : _bRoutledge, _cOctober 2000
520	3		_aHow to characterize the relationship between member governments and the European Commission has long been a matter of controversy among EU scholars. Although most now agree that traditional theoretical frameworks - inter-governmentalism and supranationalism - are inadequate to understand the complexities of EU governance, few viable alternatives have emerged. In this article, I provide a prospective look into a promising approach. The analytical framework is built on insights adapted from the new economics of organization (NEO). Specifically, I fuse the theoretical notion of incomplete contracting with principal - agent analytics to explain both the form and content of supranational delegation. The framework promises to offer scholars the means to get away from asking whether or not member governments dominate supranational institutions, to an inquiry wherein one can distinguish the conditions under which governments control supranational institutions from those where these institutions operate with a degree of autonomy.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g7, 4, p. 532-553 _dLondon : Routledge, October 2000 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100624 _b1537^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100629 _b1620^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34624 _d34624
041			_aeng