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003			OSt
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008			100624s2000 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aRITTBERGER, Berthold _99001
245	1	0	_aImpatient legislators and new issue-dimensions : _ba critique of the Garrett-Tsebelis standard version' of legislative politics
260			_aLondon : _bRoutledge, _cOctober 2000
520	3		_aThe model of EU legislative politics developed by Garrett and Tsebelis has served as the main reference point for scholars studying the EU legislative process. It stipulates that the preferences of actors in the EU legislative process (the member states, the European Parliament and the Commission) are distributed one - dimensionally along a more - less integration continuum. Furthermore, the Garrett - Tsebelis model predicts that under the rules governing the co - decision introduced at Maastricht, the European Parliament will be systematically worse off than under the provisions of the co - operation procedure and will, as a result, invariably accept any legislation proposed by the pivotal Council member state. This article argues that the Garrett - Tsebelis model falls short of explaining why the European Parliament sometimes rejects legislation. It also demonstrates that the European Parliament may actually be more influential under the co - decision procedure than Garrett and Tsebelis suggest. By analysing different directives that are subject to the co - decision procedure - thus keeping the institutional rules of co - decision constant - it can be demonstrated that actors' time horizons (their levels of impatience) and the type and salience of issue - dimensions (more or less integration, left-right, changes in institutional rules) exercise independent effects on legislators' influence and on legislative outcomes. This article thus explains cases otherwise unexplained by the 'standard version'.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g7, 4, p. 554-575 _dLondon : Routledge, October 2000 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100624 _b1539^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100629 _b1620^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34625 _d34625
041			_aeng