000			01706naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0062916383537
003			OSt
005			20190211173205.0
008			100629s1996 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aGRANDE, Edgar _923807
245	1	0	_aThe state and interest groups in a framework of multi-level decision-making : _bthe case of the European Union
260			_aLondon : _bRoutledge, _cSeptember 1996
520	3		_aAfter years of relative neglect, the role of private interest groups in European policy-making has attracted the attention of students of European integration once again. However, research on this subject suffers from the fact that the institutional peculiarities of the European Union, especially the integration of decision-making levels, have not been taken into account sufficiently. The crucial question addressed in this article is how the European system of joint multi-level decision-making affects the power and influence of private interest groups in European policy-making. It argues that, as a consequence of the new institutional framework, the logics of influence between public and private actors may differ significantly from the patterns of interest intermediation in domestic policy-making. Most interesting in this context seems to be the 'paradox of weakness', i.e. the fact that public actors can increase their autonomy vis--vis private interest groups as a consequence of their integration in systems of joint decision-making.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g3, 3, p. 318-338 _dLondon : Routledge, September 1996 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100629 _b1638^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100706 _b1102^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34736 _d34736
041			_aeng