000			01405naa a2200193uu 4500
001			0063014511437
003			OSt
005			20190211173233.0
008			100630s1997 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aGENSCHEL, Philipp _934879
245	1	0	_aRegulatory competition and international co-operation
260			_aLondon : _bRoutledge, _cDecember 1997
520	3		_aRecent research has shown that regulatory competition does not necessarily lead to downward pressures on regulation, but may at times also push the level of regulation upwards. Extending David Vogel's 'California effect' argument, this article shows that such upward pressure may not only result directly from the dynamics of the competitive process but also from international co-operation. Evidence from two case studies on international capital market regulation is used to identify the conditions under which co-operation in the shadow of regulatory competition is likely to succeed or fail. The successful multilateral standardization of banking capital requirements in the BIS is compared to failed attempts to harmonize interest taxation across EC member states.
700	1		_aPLÜMPER, Thomas _917945
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g4, 4, p. 626-642 _dLondon : Routledge, December 1997 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100630 _b1451^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100706 _b1114^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34772 _d34772
041			_aeng