000			01761naa a2200205uu 4500
001			0063015034937
003			OSt
005			20190211173239.0
008			100630s1997 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aDOERN, G. Bruce _92975
245	1	0	_aThe european patent office and the political economy of european intellectual property policy
260			_aLondon : _bRoutledge, _cSeptember 1997
520	3		_aThe article examines the European Patent Office and how the political economy of intellectual property policy helps to explain the observed sluggishness of European patent filing activity compared to the US and Japan. The analysis also focuses on intellectual property (IP) policy tensions regarding the protection versus the dissemination of IP.
520	3		_aThe article shows that the protection function of the European Patent Office (EPO) is driven increasingly by big business pressure (from European and US multinationals) to improve pendency rates and lower costs. On the other hand, regarding the dissemination function, the EPO and national patent offices are under greater pressure to enhance awareness of IP rights and IP knowledge to interests, such as small business, that are more dispersed and weak.
520	3		_aThe analysis further shows that the relations between the EPO and national offices exhibit a delicate balance between co-operation and competition, financial viability and fee sharing, and concerns about translation and the language of commerce and the survival of national offices.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g4, 3, p. 388-403 _dLondon : Routledge, September 1997 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100630 _b1503^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100706 _b1111^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34780 _d34780
041			_aeng