000			01739naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0063015453937
003			OSt
005			20190211173250.0
008			100630s1997 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSHAPIRO, Martin _941430
245	1	0	_aThe problems of independent agencies in the United States and the European Union
260			_aLondon : _bRoutledge, _cJune 1997
520	3		_aThe word independent in the United States (US) context is most properly used in connection with the independent regulatory commissions. Those commissions are not independent of Congressional control. Both the commissions and the agencies of the regular cabinet departments live in a regime of statutory duties under which Congressional statutes not presidential policies control much of their behavior. Both are subject to judicial review. Commissions basically are independent in the sense that they are usually not subject to the complete control by commissioners of one political party. They are somewhat independent of the President in that no single President has appointed all the commissioners of a particular commission and commissioners may only be dismissed by the President for cause. American experience suggests that European Union (EU) independent agencies will create severe problems of co-ordination, legitimacy and control. These problems are not alleviated by the claim that EU agencies will have purely informational roles because information is a key element in policy-making and policy controversy.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g4, 2, p. 276-291 _dLondon : Routledge, June 1997 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100630 _b1545^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100706 _b1109^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34793 _d34793
041			_aeng