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008 | 100630s1998 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
100 | 1 |
_aWEBBER, Douglas _941431 |
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_aHigh midnight in Brussels : _ban analysis of the september 1993 council meeting on the GATT Uruguay round |
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_aLondon : _bRoutledge, _cDecember 1998 |
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520 | 3 | _aMost of the recent theoretical work on the European Union (EU) and the European integration process stresses the erosion of the capacity of the governments of the member states to influence policy decisions. This article analyses a meeting of the Council of Ministers in Brussels in September 1993, the run-up to the meeting and its sequel. At this meeting, the conflict between the Commission and France over an agricultural trade accord negotiated by the Commission and the US in the GATT Uruguay Round came to a head. In effect, this conflict was won, it is argued here, by France, suggesting that the national 'veto' or threat of it may still be an effective weapon in the EU. The analysis emphasizes the extent to which the EU decision-making process, in this decisive phase of the Uruguay Round, was dominated by the Franco-German 'tandem'. The bilateral 'pre-negotiation' of EU decisions by Bonn and Paris and the multilateralization of their agreements in the Council are neither ubiquitous in the EU nor limited to the great 'history-making' issues. Franco-German bilateralism, where it does function, may constitute an important device for the mediation of conflicts that could otherwise paralyse or slow down the decision-making process. | |
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_tJournal of European Public Policy _g5, 4, p. 578-594 _dLondon : Routledge, December 1998 _xISSN 13501763 _w |
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_a20100630 _b1550^b _cDaiane |
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_a20100706 _b1116^b _cCarolina |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34797 _d34797 |
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041 | _aeng |