000			01601naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0063016425337
003			OSt
005			20190211173303.0
008			100630s1998 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aEGAN, Michelle _917250
245	1	0	_aRegulatory strategies, delegation and European market integration
260			_aLondon : _bRoutledge, _cSeptember 1998
520	3		_aThe shift in regulatory strategy that accompanied the single market program has enabled the EU to delegate responsibility for setting the rules governing market access to standard-setting bodies. In doing so, the new regulatory regime resulting from this delegation has enabled firms to become dominant players in the policy-making process. This article demonstrates that the resulting regulatory regime has not produced the expected outcomes since firms have been unable to overcome the same kinds of collective action problems that plagued the harmonization process. Using principal-agent analysis, the article highlights the resulting efforts to deal with the absence of common standards by discussing Community efforts to monitor, oversee and control the pace of European standardization. It then discusses the impact of such delegation upon European governance to demonstrate some of the problems brought about by the increasing use of 'private actors' in the policy-making process.
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g5, 3, p. 485-506 _dLondon : Routledge, September 1998 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100630 _b1642^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100706 _b1053^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34810 _d34810
041			_aeng