000			01298naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0070216180537
003			OSt
005			20190211173404.0
008			100702s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aGALLUCCI, Robert L. _941522
245	1	0	_aAverting nuclear catastrophe : _bcontempling extreme responses to US vulnerability
260			_aThousand Oaks : _bSAGE, _cSeptember 2006
520	3		_aTraditional deterrence is not an effective approach toward terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe. Preventive strategies, which call for the elimination of an enemy before it is able to attack, are highly risky and often difficult to implement. The United States should instead consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses not on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently leak nuclear weapons and materials to them. By threatening retaliation against those states, the United States may be able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent.
773	0	8	_tThe Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science _g607, p. 51-58 _dThousand Oaks : SAGE, September 2006 _xISSN 00027162 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100702 _b1618^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100706 _b1138^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c34899 _d34899
041			_aeng