000			01437naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0090213175037
003			OSt
005			20190218141817.0
008			100902s1999 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 fre d
100	1		_aWOOLLEY, John T. _942086
245	1	0	_aLes conséquences du fédéralisme sur l'élaboration de la politique de la Réserve fédérale
260			_aParis : _bIIAP, _coct./déc. 1999
520	3		_aThe Federal Reserve has a regional composition formed by twelve district banks and a central council, the council of governors. Several institutional characteristics contribute to the independence of the Federal Reserve, however the four-year mandate of the president of the Reserve expires, quite by chance, at the beginning of the year of the presidential election, something which is not without consequence for the relations between the Reserve and those in political power. The Federal Open Market Committee, the principal decision-making body of the Reserve, is made up notably of the presidents of the district banks, often accused of carrying out a strict form of monetary policy. An analysis of the reports of meetings over a limited period allows for a clarification of this judgement
773	0	8	_tRevue Française D'Administration Publique _g92, p. 671-680 _dParis : IIAP, oct./déc. 1999 _xISSN 01527401 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20100902 _b1317^b _cDaiane
998			_a20100915 _b1125^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c36008 _d36008
041			_afre