000			01912naa a2200193uu 4500
001			0101914552637
003			OSt
005			20190211173816.0
008			101019s2004 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aANDERSON, Ronald C. _942756
245	1	0	_aBoard composition : _bbalancing family influence in S&P 500 firms
260			_aIthaca : _bJohnson Graduate of Management, _cJune 2004
520	3		_aWe examine the mechanisms used to limit expropriation of firm wealth by large shareholders among S&P 500 firms with founding-family ownership. Consistent with agency theory, we find that the most valuable public firms are those in which independent directors balance family board representation. In contrast, in firms with continued founding-family ownership and relatively few independent directors, firm performance is significantly worse than in non-family firms. We also find that a moderate family board presence provides substantial benefits to the firm. Additional tests suggest that families often seek to minimize the presence of independent directors, while outside shareholders seek independent director representation. These findings highlight the importance of independent directors in mitigating conflicts between shareholder groups and imply that the interests of minority investors are best protected when, through independent directors, they have power relative to family shareholders. We argue that expanding the discussion beyond manager-shareholder conflicts to include conflicts between shareholder groups provides a richer setting in which to explore corporate governance and the balance of power in U.S. firms
700	1		_aREEB, David M _942757
773	0	8	_tAdministrative Science Quarterly _g49, 2, p. 209-237 _dIthaca : Johnson Graduate of Management, June 2004 _xISSN 00018392 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20101019 _b1455^b _cDaiane
998			_a20101019 _b1603^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c36958 _d36958
041			_aeng