000			01507naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0121317443637
003			OSt
005			20190211174100.0
008			101213s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aLANGBEIN, Laura _938496
245	1	0	_aEconomics, public service motivation, and pay for performance : _bcomplements or substitutes?
260			_aPhiladelphia : _bRoutledge, _cMarch 2010
520	3		_aThis article summarizes what we can learn from personnel economics about the likely empirical veracity of the statements regarding the efficacy of pay for performance in the public sector: If pay is based on public service performance, and if people work for pay, then pay for performance will align motivation and performance. I argue instead that the predominant conclusion from the economics literature, which focuses on the private sector, is that in many contexts usually thought to characterize public as well as private sector employment, motivation, pay, and performance are more likely to be substitutes at critical margins. The consequence is that performance pay may have unintended adverse consequences. It is not widely used in many complex private sector organizations and probably should not be widely used in similar public sector operations
773	0	8	_tInternational Public Management Journal _g13, 1, p. 9-23 _dPhiladelphia : Routledge, March 2010 _xISSN 10967494 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20101213 _b1744^b _cDaiane
998			_a20110119 _b1513^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c37723 _d37723
041			_aeng