000			01233naa a2200181uu 4500
001			0121317463537
003			OSt
005			20231018145054.0
008			101213s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_916671 _aMoynihan, Donald P.
245	1	0	_aA workforce of cynics? The effects of contemporary reforms on public service motivation
260			_aPhiladelphia : _bRoutledge, _cMarch 2010
520	3		_aThis article examines how norms and intrinsic forms of motivation can inform agency-theory assumptions about how to manage bureaucratic misbehavior. In particular, the potential for public service motivation to mediate self-interested moral hazard is examined. Recent decades have seen the public sector move toward a market model, which has increased the opportunities for moral hazard by tying high-powered incentives to incomplete contracts. At the same time, the market model may crowd out intrinsic values that provide the best protection against exploitation of those situations
773	0	8	_tInternational Public Management Journal _g13, 1, p. 24-34 _dPhiladelphia : Routledge, March 2010 _xISSN 10967494 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20101213 _b1746^b _cDaiane
998			_a20110119 _b1513^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c37724 _d37724
041			_aeng