000			01912naa a2200205uu 4500
001			0121515052037
003			OSt
005			20190211174216.0
008			101215s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSTEELE, Jennifer L. _943429
245	1	0	_aDo financial incentives help low-performing schools attract and keep academically talented teachers? Evidence from California
260			_aHoboken : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cSummer 2010
520	3		_aThis study capitalizes on a natural experiment that occurred in California between 2000 and 2002. In those years, the state offered a competitively allocated $20,000 incentive called the Governor's Teaching Fellowship (GTF) aimed at attracting academically talented, novice teachers to low-performing schools and retaining them in those schools for at least four years. Taking advantage of data on the career histories of 27,106 individuals who pursued California teaching licenses between 1998 and 2003, we use an instrumental variable strategy to estimate the unbiased impact of the GTF on the decisions of recipients to begin working in low-performing schools within 2 years after licensure program enrollment. We estimate that GTF recipients would have been less likely to teach in low-performing schools than observably similar counterparts had the GTF not existed, but that acquiring a GTF increased their probability of doing so by 28 percentage points. Examining retention patterns, we find that 75 percent of both GTF recipients and nonrecipients who began working in low-performing schools remained in such schools for at least four years
700	1		_aMURNANE, Richard J. _943430
700	1		_aWILLETT, John B _943431
773	0	8	_tJournal of Policy Analysis and Management _g29, 3, p. 451-478 _dHoboken : Wiley-Blackwell, Summer 2010 _xISSN 02768739 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20101215 _b1505^b _cDaiane
998			_a20110118 _b1735^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c37798 _d37798
041			_aeng