000			01886naa a2200193uu 4500
001			0121516084637
003			OSt
005			20190211174228.0
008			101215s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aHARSMAN, Björn _943454
245	1	0	_aPolitical and public acceptability of congestion pricing : _bideology and self-interest
260			_aHoboken : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cFall 2010
520	3		_aStudies of the “stated preferences” of households generally report public and political opposition by urban commuters to congestion pricing. It is thought that this opposition inhibits or precludes tolls and pricing systems that would enhance efficiency in the use of scarce roadways. This paper analyzes the only case in which road pricing was decided by a citizen referendum on the basis of experience with a specific pricing system. The city of Stockholm introduced a toll system for seven months in 2006, after which citizens voted on its permanent adoption. We match precinct voting records to resident commute times and costs by traffic zone, and we analyze patterns of voting in response to economic and political incentives. We document political and ideological incentives for citizen choice, but we also find that the pattern of time savings and incremental costs exerts a powerful influence on voting behavior. In this instance, at least, citizen voters behave as if they value commute time highly. When they have experienced first-hand the out-of-pocket costs and time savings of a specific pricing scheme, they are prepared to adopt freely policies that reduce congestion on urban motorways
700	1		_aQUIGLEY, John M _943455
773	0	8	_tJournal of Policy Analysis and Management _g29, 4, p. 854-874 _dHoboken : Wiley-Blackwell, Fall 2010 _xISSN 02768739 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20101215 _b1608^b _cDaiane
998			_a20101217 _b1539^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c37811 _d37811
041			_aeng