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001 | 0122010595041 | ||
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005 | 20220601062540.0 | ||
008 | 101220s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
100 | 1 |
_aRADAELLI, Claudio M _923117 |
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245 | 1 | 0 | _aRegulating rule-making via impact assessment |
260 |
_aMalden : _bWiley-Blackweel, _cjan. 2010 |
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520 | 3 | _aIn their attempt to promote better regulation, governments have ended up with increasing regulation of rule-making. Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is a manifestation of this trend. This article draws on the positive political economy hypothesis that RIA is an administrative control device. Rational politicianspositive political economy arguesdesign administrative requirements to solve problems of political uncertainty. This is a rather abstract hypothesis but with clearly observable implications. Empirical analysis on Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the EU shows that the modes and level of control vary, with almost no evidence supporting the positive political economy hypothesis in Denmark and Sweden and more robust evidence in the other cases, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. The EU scores high, but control has both a political component and an infra-organizational dimension. In between the extremes I find modest levels of political control in Canada and the Netherlands | |
650 | 4 |
_911932 _a Política Econômica |
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651 | 4 |
_aHolanda _913170 |
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651 | 4 |
_aSuécia _913172 |
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651 | 4 |
_aInglaterra _913196 |
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651 | 4 |
_aCanadá _913666 |
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773 | 0 | 8 |
_tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions _g23, 1, p. 89-108 _dMalden : Wiley-Blackweel, jan. 2010 _xISSN 09521895 _w |
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_a20101220 _b1059^b _cJaqueline |
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_a20110131 _b1012^b _cKeicielle |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c37867 _d37867 |
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041 | _aeng |