000 01898naa a2200253uu 4500
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003 OSt
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008 101220s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100 1 _aRADAELLI, Claudio M
_923117
245 1 0 _aRegulating rule-making via impact assessment
260 _aMalden :
_bWiley-Blackweel,
_cjan. 2010
520 3 _aIn their attempt to promote “better regulation”, governments have ended up with increasing regulation of rule-making. Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is a manifestation of this trend. This article draws on the positive political economy hypothesis that RIA is an administrative control device. Rational politicians—positive political economy argues—design administrative requirements to solve problems of political uncertainty. This is a rather abstract hypothesis but with clearly observable implications. Empirical analysis on Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the EU shows that the modes and level of control vary, with almost no evidence supporting the positive political economy hypothesis in Denmark and Sweden and more robust evidence in the other cases, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. The EU scores high, but control has both a political component and an infra-organizational dimension. In between the extremes I find modest levels of political control in Canada and the Netherlands
650 4 _911932
_a Política Econômica
651 4 _aHolanda
_913170
651 4 _aSuécia
_913172
651 4 _aInglaterra
_913196
651 4 _aCanadá
_913666
773 0 8 _tGovernance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions
_g23, 1, p. 89-108
_dMalden : Wiley-Blackweel, jan. 2010
_xISSN 09521895
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20101220
_b1059^b
_cJaqueline
998 _a20110131
_b1012^b
_cKeicielle
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c37867
_d37867
041 _aeng