000			01971naa a2200241uu 4500
001			1050615165137
003			OSt
005			20190211175034.0
008			110506s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aTALLBERG, Jonas _910484
245	1	0	_aExplaining the institutional foundations of European Union negotiations
260			_aOxfordshire : _bRoutledge, _caug. 2010
520	3		_aEuropean Union (EU) negotiations take place within the framework of a set of formal and informal institutions. Member states negotiate in the organizational context of the Council and the European Council, take decisions through alternative procedures and decision rules, and sustain a set of norms for the conduct of negotiations. While the effects of these institutions on negotiation behaviour and outcomes have received extensive attention, the question of why these particular institutions have been established or evolved remains underexplored. This contribution makes an argument in favour of systematic attention to the design of negotiation institutions in the EU, and suggests that we should draw on general theoretical approaches to institutional design for these purposes. Moreover, rather than engaging in the exercise of trying to prove or falsify theoretical approaches, we should exploit the potential for explanatory complementarities in concrete empirical domains. To this end, the paper advances a domain-of-application approach to institutional design and illustrates its applicability to EU negotiation institutions through four empirical illustrations
650		4	_aÁrea de Livre Comércio _912994
650		4	_aOrganização Internacional _912901
650		4	_aNegociação _912278
650		4	_912712 _aTeoria Administrativa
651		4	_aEuropa _912887
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g17, 5, p. 633-647 _dOxfordshire : Routledge, aug. 2010 _xISSN 13501763 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20110506 _b1516^b _cDaiane
998			_a20110630 _b1443^b _cKeicielle
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c39351 _d39351
041			_aeng