000			01866naa a2200289uu 4500
001			1050914223537
003			OSt
005			20190211175121.0
008			110509s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBROWN, Trevor L _91507
245	1	0	_aContracting for coplex products
260			_aCary : _bOxford University, _cjan. 2010
520	3		_aA fundamental source of contracting failure is product uncertainty. When the product's cost, quality, and quality cannot be easily defined, buyers and sellers are unable to clearly and completely define exchange terms. The risk is that the buyer is the only purchaser of this "complex product", and once the contract is let, the vendor is the only supplier. The consequence is a collective action problem in which each party has incentives to exploit contract ambiguities for their own gain at the other's expense. We lay out the theoretical case for how complex contracting risks collective action problems. We then illustrate the theory's analytic value with the case of the Coast Guard's controversial Deepwater project, a major acquisition program to upgrade and integrate its fleet of air and sea assets. Through this case, we show how managing the state of agents requires understanding how different principal-agent relations' work
590			_aThe sate of agents: a special issue
590			_aVolume 20
590			_aSupplement 1
590			_aJanuary 2010
650		4	_aGestão de Contratos _913064
650		4	_aContrato Público _912068
700	1		_aPOTOSKI, Matthew _98573
700	1		_aSLYKE, David M. Van _910100
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g20, 1, p. i41-i58 _dCary : Oxford University, jan. 2010 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20110509 _b1422^b _cDaiane
998			_a20120517 _b1510^b _cGeisneer
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c39397 _d39397
041			_aeng