000			01968naa a2200265uu 4500
001			1050915234137
003			OSt
005			20190211175133.0
008			110509s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWEIBEL, Antoinette _944752
245	1	0	_aPay for performance in the public sector - benefits and (hidden) costs
260			_aCary : _bOxford University, _capr. 2010
520	3		_aCurrent reforms in the public sector are characterized by the introduction of businesslike incentive structures, in particular the introduction of "pay for performance" schemes in public institutions. However, the public sector has some specific characteristics, which migh restrict the naive adoption of pay for performance. Our article analyzes whether the impact of pay for performance on performance is bound to conditions, and if this is the case, under which conditions pay for performance has a positive or a negative effect on performance. We explore this contingency in a meta-analytic review of previous experimental studies on the effects of pay for performance on performance. We further show why pay for performence sometimes negatively affects personal efforts. With an experimental bignette study we demonstrate (a) that motivation is likely, and (b) that pay for performance is generally more costly as it appears because it almost always produces hidden costs of rewards. Our findings help to explain the modest success of pay performance in the public sector
650		4	_aReforma Administrativa _911957
650		4	_aRelações de Trabalho _912947
650		4	_aMotivação _913028
650		4	_aRemuneração _912136
650		4	_aAvaliação de Desempenho _912937
700	1		_aROST, Katja _944753
700	1		_aOSTERLOH, Margit _944754
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g20, 2, p. 387-412 _dCary : Oxford University, apr. 2010 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20110509 _b1523^b _cDaiane
998			_a20120517 _b1516^b _cGeisneer
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c39410 _d39410
041			_aeng