000			02733naa a2200349uu 4500
001			1051016264837
003			OSt
005			20240604062543.0
008			110510s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aFENN, Paul _944770
245	1	0	_aEnterprise liability, risk pooling and diagnostic care
260			_aCary : _bOxford University, _cjuly 2010
520	3		_aThe safety of patients is an important responsability of health care providers, and significant compensation costs may arise if providers are negligent. A widely debated option involves liability for such compensation being placed with the hospital rather than the individual clinician, a system known as "enterprise liability". In the United States, partial adoption of enterprise liability and proposals for its universal introduction have accompanied high-profile "malpractice insurance crises" in the last two decades. Hospitals in England and Wales have been subject to this sytem since 1990, and risk-pooling arrangements have emerged subsequently allowing hospitals to tranfer their liability risk to an agency known as the National Health Service Litigation Authority. We explore some of the mechanisms used by this agency to provide hospital management with financial incentives to take care. We estimate the influence of these arrangements on the use of diagnostic imaging tests within shift took place leading to a form of "natural experiment". Our results suggest that the use of diagnostic tests did not respond to the incentives created during this period. We speculate that certain types of patient care activity, including the use of diagnostic tests, may be less responsive to incentives placed at the level of the hospital by comparison with incentives placed at the level of the clinician. Our findings may have implications for jurisdictions contemplating a move to enterprise liability as well as wider implications for public-sector organizations faced with financial incentives to improve service quality
590			_aIncentives and Public Service Performance: a special issue
590			_aVolume 20
590			_aSupplement 2
590			_aJuly 2010
650		4	_912122 _aPolítica de Saúde
650		4	_aControle de Qualidade _912058
650		4	_aEmpresa Privada _912915
650		4	_aRegulação _912883
650		4	_aFiscalização _912997
700	1		_aGRAY, Alastair _944771
700	1		_aRICKMAN, Neil _944772
700	1		_aVENCAPPA, Dev _944773
700	1		_aRIVERO, Oliver _944774
700	1		_aLOTTI, Emanuela _944775
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g20, 2, p. i225-i242 _dCary : Oxford University, july 2010 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20110510 _b1626^b _cDaiane
998			_a20120517 _b1521^b _cGeisneer
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c39422 _d39422
041			_aeng