000			02167naa a2200289uu 4500
001			1051115471337
003			OSt
005			20241015062702.0
008			110511s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_94904 _aHood, Christopher
245	1	0	_aThe political payoff from performance target systems : _bno-brainer or no-gainer?
260			_aCary : _bOxford University, _cjuly 2010
520	3		_aAssuming elected politicians have some incentive to adopt public service management systems that will help secure their reelection, this article tests 11 hypotheses about political payoffs to incumbents from ambitious performance target systems. The data come from central performance targets for health and education in Great Britain in the early 2000s and are analyzed through a "consilience approach that combines analysis of electoral and opinion poll data with analysis of press reports, legislative committee reports, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development reports, and interviews with senior civil servants. This article uses the weaker target regimes used in Scotland and Wales as against England at that time to explore the difference targets made to credit obtained by incumbent politicians. We find little clear evidence for direct electoral benefits from the tough English targets and also little evidence for symbolic benefits for the incumbent government in support from other actors. These findings prompt questions as to why politicians should have invested significant time and political capital in such a public service management system
590			_aIncentives and Public Service Performance: a special issue
590			_aVolume 20
590			_aSupplement 2
590			_aJuly 2010
650		4	_aPrestação de Serviço _912129
650		4	_912937 _aAvaliação de Desempenho
651		4	_aInglaterra _913196
700	1		_aDIXON, Ruth _936049
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART _g20, 2, p. i281-i298 _dCary : Oxford University, july 2010 _xISSN 10531858 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20110511 _b1547^b _cDaiane
998			_a20120517 _b1523^b _cGeisneer
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c39425 _d39425
041			_aeng