000 01567naa a2200265uu 4500
001 1081913165237
003 OSt
005 20190211175516.0
008 110819s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100 1 _aFONG, Eric A.
_935423
245 1 0 _aThe effect of CEO pay deviations on CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profits
260 _aU.S.A :
_bWiley-Blackwell,
_cjune 2010
520 3 _aWe build upon previous work on the effects of deviations in CEO pay from labor markets to assess how overcompensation or undercompensation affects subsequent voluntary CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profitability, taking into account the moderating effect of firm ownership structure. We find that CEO underpayment is related to changes in firm size and CEO withdrawal, and that the relationship between CEO underpayment and CEO withdrawal is stronger in owner-controlled firms. We also show that when CEOs are overpaid, there is higher firm profitability; a relationship that is weaker among manager-controlled firms. We then discuss the implications that these findings have for future research.
650 4 _aAlta Administração
_914212
650 4 _aSalário
_911971
650 4 _aMercado de Trabalho
_912945
650 4 _aAnálise Ocupacional
_912106
650 4 _aCusto Benefício
_912964
700 1 _aMISANGYI, Vilmos F.
_936106
700 1 _aTOSI Jr., Henry L.
_929124
773 0 8 _tStrategic Management Journal
_g31, 6, p. 629-651
_dU.S.A : Wiley-Blackwell, june 2010
_xISSN 01432095
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20110819
_b1316^b
_cFernanda
998 _a20111017
_b1604^b
_cKeicielle
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c40208
_d40208
041 _aeng