000 | 01567naa a2200265uu 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | 1081913165237 | ||
003 | OSt | ||
005 | 20190211175516.0 | ||
008 | 110819s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
100 | 1 |
_aFONG, Eric A. _935423 |
|
245 | 1 | 0 | _aThe effect of CEO pay deviations on CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profits |
260 |
_aU.S.A : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cjune 2010 |
||
520 | 3 | _aWe build upon previous work on the effects of deviations in CEO pay from labor markets to assess how overcompensation or undercompensation affects subsequent voluntary CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profitability, taking into account the moderating effect of firm ownership structure. We find that CEO underpayment is related to changes in firm size and CEO withdrawal, and that the relationship between CEO underpayment and CEO withdrawal is stronger in owner-controlled firms. We also show that when CEOs are overpaid, there is higher firm profitability; a relationship that is weaker among manager-controlled firms. We then discuss the implications that these findings have for future research. | |
650 | 4 |
_aAlta Administração _914212 |
|
650 | 4 |
_aSalário _911971 |
|
650 | 4 |
_aMercado de Trabalho _912945 |
|
650 | 4 |
_aAnálise Ocupacional _912106 |
|
650 | 4 |
_aCusto Benefício _912964 |
|
700 | 1 |
_aMISANGYI, Vilmos F. _936106 |
|
700 | 1 |
_aTOSI Jr., Henry L. _929124 |
|
773 | 0 | 8 |
_tStrategic Management Journal _g31, 6, p. 629-651 _dU.S.A : Wiley-Blackwell, june 2010 _xISSN 01432095 _w |
942 | _cS | ||
998 |
_a20110819 _b1316^b _cFernanda |
||
998 |
_a20111017 _b1604^b _cKeicielle |
||
999 |
_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c40208 _d40208 |
||
041 | _aeng |