000 | 02339naa a2200253uu 4500 | ||
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001 | 1082213250637 | ||
003 | OSt | ||
005 | 20190211175548.0 | ||
008 | 110822s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
100 | 1 |
_aARIKAN, Asli M. _945302 |
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245 | 1 | 0 | _aDo newly public acquirers benefit or suffer from their pre-IPO affiliations with underwriters and VCs? |
260 |
_aU.S.A : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cdec. 2010 |
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520 | 3 | _aWe examine whether pre-IPO affiliations affect post-IPO corporate events, namely acquisitions. On the one hand, newly public acquirers may benefit from their pre-IPO affiliations through residual signaling value or/and resource-related benefits. On the other hand, newly public acquirers may suffer from those affiliations when conflicts of interests arise during the post-IPO period. Equity underwriters may have incentive to promote nonvalue-creating acquisitions (Type II error), and venture capitalists (VCs) may have incentive to forgo strategically important acquisitions (Type I error). Drawing on a sample of 4,029 acquisitions made by 717 newly public firms, we find that on average the announcement of an acquisition by a newly public acquirer elicits a positive response from investors. The market views more favorably the acquisitions announced by newly public acquirers associated with prestigious equity underwriters, but this reaction becomes negative when the lead underwriter is retained as the acquisition advisor. The market reacts more favorably to acquisitions announced by VC-backed newly public acquirers, but only when those VCs are committed to a longer lockup period. The effects of pre-IPO affiliations on expected returns are stronger for newly public acquirers with a high intangible resource base and persist throughout the three-year post-IPO period (across each subsequent acquisition announcement). Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. | |
650 | 4 |
_aMercado de Capitais _913704 |
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650 | 4 |
_aOferta Pública Inicial _945387 |
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650 | 4 |
_aInvestimento Público _912121 |
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650 | 4 |
_aEstratégia _913613 |
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650 | 4 |
_aModelo de Gestão _912032 |
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700 | 1 |
_aCAPRON, Laurence _91802 |
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773 | 0 | 8 |
_tStrategic Management Journal _g31, 12, p. 1257-1289 _dU.S.A : Wiley-Blackwell, dec. 2010 _xISSN 01432095 _w |
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_a20110822 _b1325^b _cFernanda |
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_a20111031 _b1505^b _cKeicielle |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c40246 _d40246 |
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041 | _aeng |