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008 | 111027s2004 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
100 | 1 |
_aFORDER, Julien _943332 |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aPrices, contracts and motivations : _binstitutional arrangements in domiciliary care |
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_aUK : _bPolicy Press, _capr. 2004 |
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520 | 3 | _aThe social care reforms of the early 1990s have had profound effects on the domiciliary care system. The adoption of markets and the 'enabling' role for local authorities are central features. In contrast to much of the original rhetoric that lay behind these reforms, economic theory emphasises the importance of the institutional arrangements in affecting performance. Given the discretion that local authorities have over the specific form of transactions with providers, questions about contract choices are especially pertinent. This article describes the range of arrangements being used and the different implications of contract choices. In the context of relatively competitive markets and organisations exhibiting a range of business motivations, the evidence supports the hypothesis that for otherwise equivalent providers, prices are significantly affected by contract type. In short, institutional arrangements matter | |
700 | 1 |
_aKNAPP, Martin _934648 |
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700 | 1 |
_aHARDY, Brian _919494 |
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700 | 1 |
_aKENDALL, Jeremy _941385 |
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700 | 1 |
_aMATOSEVIC, Tihana _934647 |
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700 | 1 |
_aWARE, Patricia _945795 |
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773 | 0 | 8 |
_tPolicy & Politics _g32, 2, p. 207-222 _dUK : Policy Press, apr. 2004 _xISSN 03055736 _w |
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_a20111027 _b1549^b _cGeisneer |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c40812 _d40812 |
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041 | _aeng |