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| 001 | 1110115471041 | ||
| 003 | OSt | ||
| 005 | 20190211180028.0 | ||
| 008 | 111101s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aLONSDALE, Chris _924166 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aRisk transfer and the UK Private Finance Initiative : _ba theoretical analysis |
| 260 |
_aUK : _bPolicy Press, _capr. 2005 |
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| 520 | 3 | _aThe UK's Private Finance Initiative (PFI) closely resembles the bilateral contracting mechanism advanced by transaction cost economics (TCE). However, the principles informing both the PFI and TCE generally are seriously flawed. In particular, TCE does not accommodate the concept of power, makes incorrect assumptions about the capabilities of organisational buying functions and lacks an appreciation of the political nature of organisational decision making. The impact of these flaws can be recognised in many PFI projects and can help explain why on so many occasions risk has not been transferred to private sector suppliers | |
| 651 | 4 |
_aChina _913345 |
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| 773 | 0 | 8 |
_tPolicy & Politics _g33, 2, p. 231-249 _dUK : Policy Press, apr. 2005 _xISSN 03055736 _w |
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_a20111101 _b1547^b _cGeisneer |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c40845 _d40845 |
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| 041 | _aeng | ||